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George Watts & Son v. Tiffany & Co.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Employers have generally rejoiced over the Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.' decision that upheld the right of employers to utilize arbitration
agreements to settle a wide range of workplace disputes from employment
discrimination issues to contractual disputes. Employers, and other
supporters of arbitration have long maintained that arbitration is a much more
affordable and expedient method .of resolving workplace disputes than
traditional litigation. There is a dark side to arbitration, and that is whether
parties to arbitration should be bound by the terms of an arbitration award
when the arbitrator has clearly disregarded the law or has violated some basic
public policy tenets. In other words, should the federal courts be able to
intervene and vacate arbitration awards when the arbitrator displays a
"manifest disregard" of the law?
The answer to that question is far from clear, and a recent decision,
George Watts & Son v. Tiffany & Co.,2 appears to answer that question in the
negative. The unique holding in this case seems to have bolstered the premise
that arbitrator decisions should stand unless the arbitrator clearly orders the
parties to violate the law. The Seventh Circuit in this case uses a far different
analysis than other circuits, stated that an arbitrator's decision cannot be
vacated for manifest disregard provided that the arbitrator has the same
power to act as would the parties themselves if left to their own devices.3 In
other words, the arbitrator is acting as an agent of the parties and, as such,
his/her only obligation is to fashion an award that the parties could have
created on their own.
4
This is the first time that any circuit court has applied agency theory to
the concept of manifest disregard. The Seventh Circuit has managed to turn
judicial attention from issues of law to the relationship of the arbitrator to the
parties. Certainly, this is a less troublesome and less taxing analysis for the
court as to whether the arbitrator has committed manifest disregard.
However, this approach flies in the face of other circuits' understanding and
application of the manifest disregard doctrine. In order to better understand
* 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2 George Watts & Son v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
3 Id. at 580.
4 Id. at 580-81.
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the unique nature of this decision, it is necessary to examine briefly the
judicial history of manifest disregard.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MANIFEST DISREGARD
Arbitration was statutorily sanctioned through the Federal Arbitration
Act that provided for very specific reasons to vacate an arbitration award in 9
U.S.C. § 10. Specifically, section 10 states that the award may be vacated by
the federal courts,
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing
to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or for any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made.5
The federal courts have no problem in vacating an arbitration award
when one of these provisions has been violated, but these cases are few and
far between. Far more likely to arise are cases in which the arbitrator has not
committed an overt example of outrageous behavior, but the award itself
seems to run contrary to existing law. Such is the case with manifest
disregard.
Manifest disregard is almost universally thought of as a non-statutory
basis for vacating an arbitration award. It was first articulated as such by
Wilko v. Swan,6 a case dealing with securities fraud. The doctrine was
articulated through dicta,7 and although the case was later overturned on
5 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
6 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 201 F.2d 439 (2d
Cir. 1953).
7 The dicta from Wilko reads,
While it may be true... that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with
the provisions of [relevant law] would "constitute grounds for vacating the award
pursuant to Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act," that failure would need to be
made clearly to appear. In unrestricted submissions [to arbitration] ... the
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other grounds, the manifest disregard dicta remained. Today, all but the Fifth
Circuit recognize the doctrine as a non-statutory basis for vacating arbitration
decisions. 8 Even though almost all of the circuits agree that manifest
disregard is a non-statutory basis for reviewing an arbitration case, it is very
unclear from the dicta as to how the courts should apply the standard.9 The
circuit courts range in their willingness to apply the doctrine as well as how
the court should go about determining whether manifest disregard has
occurred.
Two circuits stand out from the rest because they represent the endpoints
of the continuum that is manifest disregard-the Second Circuit and the
Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit, while recognizing the manifest
disregard doctrine, is reluctant to apply the concept in all but the most rare of
circumstances.10 The court was adamant that manifest disregard went beyond
mere misinterpretation of the law. It was the court's view that the actual
record must show that the "arbitrators knew, the law and expressly
disregarded it."11
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard [of the
law] are not subject, in federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.
Id. at 436-37 (citation omitted).
8 Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1460 (11th Cir. 1997). The
court said, "Thus, every other circuit except the Fifth (which has declined to adopt any
non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards), has expressly recognized that
'manifest disregard of the law' is an appropriate reason to review and vacate an
arbitration panel's decision." Id. (citing Barnes v. Logan, 122 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 1997);
Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9 (2d
Cir. 1997); M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG, 87 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 1996);
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234 (1st Cir. 1995); United Transp. Union
Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1995); Nat'l. Wrecking Co.
v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 731, 990 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1993); McIlroy v.
PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 820 n.2 (5th Cir.1993); Upshur Coals Corp. v. United
Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1991); Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883
(8th Cir. 1993); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988)).
9 Adam Milam, A House Built on Sand: Vacating Arbitration Awards for Manifest
Disregard of the Law, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 705, 705-06 (1999).
10 Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 684 (11th Cir. 1992).
11 Gary W. Flanagan, Expanded Grounds for Judicial Review of Employment
Arbitration Awards, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 488, 491 (2000) (citing Robbins v. Paine Webber
Inc., 954 F.2d 679, 683 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting O.R. Sec. Inc. v. Prof'l Planning
Assoc., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir. 1988)).
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IH. REJECTION OF MANIFEST DISREGARD
AND THE ELEVENTH CiRcurr
The Eleventh Circuit's definition of manifest disregard was realized in
the case Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers. 12 Delfina Montes had worked
as a Sales Assistant at the Hallendale branch of Shearson. She regularly
worked over forty hours a week. Eventually, she ceased working for
Shearson and demanded overtime payments that were due her. Shearson
refused saying that she was an exempt employee and thus not entitled to
overtime. There was ample evidence and testimony to establish that Montes
was regarded as a non-exempt employee for Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) purposes. She had no supervisory duties, she filled out a time card
which was only required of non-exempt personnel, and even Shearson's
internal documents identified her as a non-exempt employee. 13 Shearson
countered that she had supervisory duties and was thus exempt from
overtime, although the evidence was slim that this was the case.14 Shearson
stated that while she may not have officially been classified as an exempt
employee, they considered her to be exempt from the provisions of the
FLSA. The case was originally heard in district court, but Shearson moved to
have the case moved to arbitration since Montes had signed an arbitration
agreement at the start of her employment with Shearson. The case was
arbitrated and the arbitrators found in favor of Shearson.
Montes brought her claim to the Eleventh Circuit claiming that the
arbitrators had manifestly disregarded the law in making their decision-in
this case, the FLSA. Even more interesting was the reason behind the
arbitrators' departure from the concerns of the FLSA. Shearson's lawyer
made explicit pleas to the panel to ignore the law. As bold as that request
may seem, what was even more surprising was that the panel decided to do
just that-ignore the FLSA provisions for exempt and non-exempt
personnel.15 Granted, the arbitrators were not attorneys, but it still is
12 Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros.,'128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997).
13 Id. at 1463. Even Montes' nameplate read "Sales Assistant."
14 Id. at 1463-64.
15 Shearson's closing statement was as follows:
You have to decide whether you're going to follow the statutes that have been
presented to you, or whether you will do or want to do or should do what is right and
just and equitable in this case. I know it's hard to have to say this and it's probably
even harder to hear it but in this case this law is not right. Know that there is a
difference between law and equity and I think, in my opinion, that difference is
crystallized in this case. The law says one thing. What equity demands and requires
and is saying is another. What is right and fair and proper in this? You know as
arbitrators you have the ability; you're not strictly bound by case law and
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shocking that any arbitrator would seriously consider it proper to ignore the
law.
The Eleventh Circuit agreed. While extremely reluctant in the past to
apply the manifest disregard doctrine, the facts in Montes were so extreme
and clear that the court had very little trouble in vacating the award. It is
highly unlikely that similar circumstances will show themselves in the same
way as they did in Montes. It was the court's opinion that the arbitrators
acted in an "arbitrary and capricious" fashion and with a "manifest
disregard" of the law that constituted grounds for vacating the arbitration
award. An arbitrator was arbitrary and capricious if "a ground for the
arbitrator's decision cannot be inferred from the facts of the case."' 16 The
Montes case was a manifest disregard case since the decision demonstrated
that the arbitrators were "[c]onscious of the law and deliberately ignore[d]
it.'17 The record itself was used as evidence that the arbitrators had
committed manifest disregard. 18
The importance of the Eleventh Circuit's "arbitrary and capricious"
standard or its use of "manifest disregard" is that plaintiffs burden of proof
is set extremely high. The court presumes from the beginning that the
arbitration award is correct and will only be vacated "if there is no ground
whatsoever for the decision." 19 This would seem to suggest that even if there
is only a thread of justification, the arbitration award would stand. Montes
was one such case where the plaintiff's burden of proof was met. The court
precedent. You have the ability to do what is right, what is fair and what is proper,
and that's what Shearson is asking you to do.
Id. at 1459 (citation omitted).
The attorney continued this theme upon closing, "thus, as I said in my Answer, as I
said before in my Opening, and I now ask you in my Closing, not to follow the FLSA if
you determine she's not an exempt employee." Id.
16 Flanagan, supra note 10, at 491-92 (quoting Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d
939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992)).
17 Montes, 128 F.3d at 1461.
18 The court made it clear as to why they decided to apply the manifest disregard
standard in this case when they so rarely applied it in other cases:
We apply it here because we are able to clearly discern from the record that this is
one of those cases where manifest disregard of the law is applicable, as the
arbitrators recognized that they were told to disregard the law (which the record
reflects they knew) in a case in which the evidence to support the award was
marginal. Thus, there is nothing in the record to refute the suggestion that the law
was disregarded. Nor does the record clearly support the award.
Id. at 1462.
19 Flanagan, supra note 10, at 492 (quoting Lifecare Int'l Inc. v. CD Med. Inc., 68
F.3d 429, 435 (1lth Cir. 1995), opinion modified and supplemented on other grounds, 85
F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1996)).
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was faced with a truly "arbitrary and capricious" set of circumstances, and
the plaintiff met the difficult burden of proof.
The Eleventh Circuit decision focuses on the explicit statements made by
Shearson's attorney to ignore the law.20 Given the outcome of the award, it
was clear that the arbitrators had agreed to do so. It is not likely in the future
that the Eleventh Circuit will review manifest disregard cases as it had in
Montes, much less embrace the concept of manifest disregard as has the
Second Circuit.
IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND MANIFEST DISREGARD
One of the most active circuits that fully supports manifest disregard is
the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit has always strongly advocated the
doctrine and takes a more liberal stance on the burden of proof that must be
met. Rather than requiring the plaintiff to shoulder the burden, the court
seems to take on the task of determining whether the facts, as presented,
warrant the arbitration award that was given. Another important hallmark of
this circuit is its view of manifest disregard as being a statutory, rather than
non-statutory reason for vacatur. The court has held that the Wilko dicta
should be interpreted as a violation of Section 10(d) of the Federal
Arbitration Act.21 When the arbitrator has clearly exceeded his statutory
authority, the court is statutorily permitted to intercede and vacate the
award. 22 However, the court was still left with the problem of deciding
whether the arbitrator had merely interpreted the contract or was in willful
violation of the law. The court settled on a definition of manifest disregard
whereby the arbitrator clearly knew the law, yet deliberately failed to follow
it.23 Later the court added that a reasonable person, trained as an arbitrator,
should be able to discern whether the error had been committed.
Judge Feinberg was instrumental in defining the manifest disregard
doctrine for the Second Circuit. His interpretation of manifest disregard
began in DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,24 where it was decided that
the arbitrator had to do something more than just commit a legal error or
misrepresentation. 25 As a result, cases involving manifest disregard had to
show "(1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to
20 Montes, 128 F.3d at 1461.
21 Flanagan, supra note 10, at 490 (citing Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean
Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1960)).
22 Id.
23 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d
Cir. 1986).




apply it; and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit,
and clearly applicable." 26 While DiRussa did not result in a vacation of the
award, it served as the basis for another decision that would surprise the legal
community, Halligan v. Piper Jaffray.27
Halligan brought a claim against his employer, Piper Jaffray, for alleged
violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
28
Hailigan had been employed in 1973 as a salesman of equity investments to
financial institutions. 29 At the time of his employment, he was required to
sign an arbitration agreement by the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) to arbitrate any future disputes. 30 Piper Jaffray terminated
Halligan more than twenty years later, allegedly for poor performance on the
job. Halligan presented strong evidence during the arbitration that his
termination was the result of age discrimination rather than for performance
related issues.31 Several other employees testified that Halligan was "the best
in his field" and at one point, Piper Jaffrey had to admit that his performance
did not warrant termination.32 Despite the evidence, the arbitrator found for
Piper..
During the proceedings, Mr. Halligan passed away due to poor health,
but his widow continued the arbitration proceedings and later, the litigation
to vacate the award. 33 The district court upheld the arbitration award, 34 but
the Second Circuit reversed.
The Second Circuit agreed that great deference should be given to an
arbitrator's award and that review of that award should be conducted only
under a number of specific circumstances. However, in acknowledging that,
the court still approached the issue of manifest disregard in a unique way-
manifest disregard of the evidence. 35 In other words, the court was concerned
whether the arbitrators had disregarded the weight of the evidence presented
in the arbitration and thus, made a "wrong" decision. In an unprecedented
move, the court reviewed the evidence presented at arbitration and then
compared that with the decision. It was the court's conclusion that the
26 Id.
27 Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).




32 Id. at 203.
33 Id. at 198.
3 4 Id. at 200.
35 Mark B. Rees, Halligan v. Piper Jaffray: The Collision Between Arbitral
Autonomy And Judicial Review, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 347,347 (1999).
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arbitrators had, "ignored the law, or the evidence, or both."'36 The record of
the arbitration proceedings left no doubt that the arbitration panel had been
clearly advised of the applicable law by the parties' legal counsel so the
arbitrators could not claim they had not been sufficiently advised of the law.
Since the arbitrators had been fully advised on the law, and, given the
considerable evidence which supported Halligan's claim of discrimination,
the court held that the arbitration decision would be voided for manifest
disregard of the law.
37
For the first time, a court of appeals intruded upon the arbitrator's role of
interpreting the evidence. The court placed itself in the role of the arbitrator
and found the arbitrator's interpretation wanting. Never had a court
attempted to second-guess the arbitrator's weighing of the evidence. In
addition, rather than relying on the plaintiff to meet a burden of proof to the
court, the court set the burden on itself-to weigh the evidence. In addition,
the court made much of the fact that there was no written decision in this
case. A written decision allows the court to understand how the arbitrators
viewed the evidence and what led to the decision. While the court repeatedly
stated that there is no statutory mandate for arbitrators to render a written
decision, the court's actions said something quite different. The court stated
that when the outcome of the arbitration decision was at odds with the
evidence, the absence of a written agreement would come in as evidence in
the determination for vacatur.
38
The Halligan court interfered with the arbitrator's right to assess the
credibility of the evidence-a province that before now, had been universally
held to be the sole power of the arbitrator. In fact, the court went so far in
assessing the "correctness" of the award, that it stated that even if the
arbitrators had a written decision, that decision would be ignored since it was
the court's opinion that the arbitration award was so contrary to the evidence
presented.3
9
36 Halligan, 148 F.3d at 204.
37 Id.
38 Id. The court did state that while arbitrators were never required to write out their
decisions, it would consider such decisions in situations in which the evidence did not
clearly match with the arbitration award. See Koch Oil, S.A. v. Transocean Gulf Oil Co.,
751 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. of Kissavos
(Marc Rich & Co., A.G.), 579 F.2d 691, 704 (2d Cir. 1978); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner &
Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972). However, in Gilmer, it was said that even if
there were inadequacies in the arbitration forum, those inadequacies should be decided on
a case-by-case basis. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 42 (1991).
The Second Circuit seems to be applying dicta here to future cases regarding the
evidentiary merit of a written arbitration decision.
39 Rees, supra note 29, at 356-57.
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The Second Circuit's opinion in Halligan was so contrary and expansive
compared to previous cases, that it was thought by some that the concept of
manifest disregard had been so broadened that it would be commonly used to
vacate arbitration awards. However, this was not always the case as later
cases demonstrated. Campbell v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co.,40 another
Southern District of New York case decided just one year after Halligan,
foreshadowed what may come to be expected of more and more litigants on
the losing end of an employment arbitration decision. While the plaintiff
seemed to take the factual approach of the Halligan court-attempting to
show that the "credibility of the evidence presented" could not be factually
shown, the court stated that this "is not a proper basis upon which to vacate
the award at issue."4 1
Contrary to what appears to be obvious in Halligan, the district judge
further stated that, "Halligan does not stand for the proposition, however, that
district courts may reweigh the evidence and second-guess the arbitrators'
credibility determinations. Rather, Halligan holds that an arbitration award
may be set aside if it is in manifest disregard of the law or facts."'42
V. ThE SEVENTH CIRcurr VIEW OF MANIFEST DISREGARD
The circuit courts have varying ideas regarding manifest disregard, and
most revolve around how to determine whether the law has been followed.
The resulting debate can be heated, and as one commentator put it, raising
the issue of manifest disregard is akin to raising the subject of politics or
religion at a dinner party-the results are often intense and explosive. 43
The Seventh Circuit in Watts has added to the debate with yet another
perspective on the issue of manifest disregard. The Watts court has now
removed itself from being principally concerned with determining whether
the arbitrator has acted beyond the law or evidence. The focus is now
whether the arbitrator has acted as a proper agent for the parties. In other
words, the issue is whether the arbitrator created an award that provides the
parties with an agreement they would have been able to forge themselves.
40 Campbell v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), affid,
205 F.3d 1321 (2d Cir. 1999).
41 Flanagan, supra note 10, at 497 (quoting Campbell, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 345, 349).
42Id.
43 See Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review
of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 50 (1997).
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VI. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF WATTS V. TIFFANY
The Seventh Circuit had, in the past, "unequivocally stated an outright
rejection of the [sic] of all non-statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration
award, including the "manifest disregard" standard as late as 1991." 44
However, the court also recognized that there are limitations on the
arbitrator's authority, "[a]rbitrators do not sit to dispense their own brand of
justice." 45 The court seemed to be more open-minded a few years later when
it used manifest disregard as a non-statutory ground to vacate arbitration
awards. 46 The acceptance did not last long, and the Watts case represents not
only the rejection of the manifest disregard doctrine, but also a dramatic
departure as to how the concept was defined.
The concept of manifest disregard had been applied in a contradictory
fashion, so the formulation of manifest disregard in Watts was an attempt to
pull together those diverse views, while at the same time preserve the
relationship of the arbitrator and the arbitration award. The court stated that
manifest disregard could only take place if the arbitrator either ordered the
parties to violate the law, or required the parties to adhere to an agreement
the terms of which the parties would not have the power to forge
themselves. 47 In other words, if the arbitrator imposed an arbitration award
that was contrary to how the parties could voluntarily choose to interact, then
the arbitrator was acting in manifest disregard of the contract. The court's
view of manifest disregard was extremely narrow and essentially ousted
manifest disregard as a non-statutory method for vacatur.
The majority was severely criticized by the minority that said this was
not a manifest disregard case nor was an agency theory approach a proper
analysis of manifest disregard. 48 The following is a summary of the dispute
and the findings of both the majority and the minority.
A. The Main Dispute
The dispute arose between George Watts & Son and Tiffany &
Company. Watts was a long-time distributor for Tiffany products. 49 Tiffany
44 Flanagan, supra note 10, at 491.
45 Id. (quoting Chameleon Dental Prod. Inc. v. Jackson, 925 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir.
1991)).
46 Id. (citing Eljer Mfg. Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir.
1994)).
47 See George Watts & Son v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001).
48 Id. at 581-85.
49 Id. at 577.
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had officially terminated the relationship through a formal, written notice,
and Watts responded by filing suit alleging that Tiffany was in violation of
the contract and in violation of the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law
(WFDL).50 Both parties decided to take their case to arbitration rather than
pursue litigation since arbitration was less expensive and timelier.51
The arbitrator's award provided for an extension of time "during which
Watts could resell Tiffany's merchandise through Watts' bridal registry but
permitted Tiffany to cease selling to Watts at the end of 2000; it also required
Tiffany to repurchase at retail price all other Tiffany merchandise remaining
in Watts' inventory."52 The one thing that the arbitration order did not
provide was for Tiffany to pay Watts' attorney fees and costs. 53 Watts
charged that the arbitrator's failure to award attorney fees and costs was a
departure from Wisconsin law, thus "requiring the courts to repair the
problem," 54 Watts brought the case to federal court charging that the
arbitrator was in error in not granting attorney fees, which was a violation of
the WFDL. The trial court upheld the arbitrator's decision and Watts
appealed.
B. Seventh Circuit's Application of Manifest Disregard
With the advent of the Watts case, the Seventh Circuit once again was
called upon to determine the definition of manifest disregard. One of the first
questions that needed to be answered was whether the arbitrator's failure to
award Watts his attorney fees represented a statutory violation of the law or
whether it was a non-statutory violation. It was Watts' contention that the
arbitrator was in violation of the WFDL by its failure to award Watts his
attorney fees. Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, noted that legal
error was not listed as grounds for vacating or modifying an award that is
under the purview of 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11, although Section 10(a)(4) does state
that an arbitration award may be vacated "[w]here the arbitrators exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
5 0 Wis. STAT. § 135.06 (2000).
If any grantor violates this chapter, a dealer may bring an action against such
grantor in any court of competent jurisdiction for damages sustained by the dealer as
a consequence of the grantor's violation, together with the actual costs of the action,
including reasonable actual attorney fees, and the dealer also may be granted
injunctive relief against unlawful termination, cancellation, nonrenewal or
substantial change of competitive circumstances.
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definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." 55 If the
arbitrator was in violation of section 10(a)(4), then the court had clear
jurisdiction to vacate the award, but this was not the case here.
The court explained that the parties had never agreed that Wisconsin law
would be determinative in this case, so the arbitrator could not have willfully
disregarded the state statute. If they had agreed that Wisconsin law would be
determinative, clearly the arbitrator's failure to follow that law, as well as his
preference or use of New York law, would constitute manifest disregard.
56
The court, therefore, had to look to non-statutory grounds for vacatur.
Specifically, the court examined whether there were "broader, extra-statutory
principles authorizing courts to review arbitrators' legal rulings, or the legal
assumptions that influence their decisions even if not identified as
conclusions of law."57 It was acknowledged that the dicta in Wilko provided
a non-statutory basis for judicial review if an arbitrator exhibited a manifest
disregard of legal rules, i.e., legal error.
58
So what does this mean? Does it mean that any legal error could
constitute manifest disregard? The Seventh Circuit did not exhibit any
consistency in how it approached non-statutory issues of manifest disregard.
It was not clear from previous decisions as to what kind of legal error is
necessary to constitute manifest disregard, so the court went through a series
of analytic steps to determine whether manifest disregard might be
committed if the arbitrator had committed any type of legal error. Such an
error might be thought of as "simple" legal error. In other words, if the
arbitrator made an error of law-i.e., not applying Wisconsin law-then the
arbitrator committed a legal error and the resulting decision would be a
manifest disregard of the law. 59 This was the foundation for Watts' claim.
Since the arbitration award contained terms that could be construed as being
most favorable to Watts, then Watts could be seen as the prevailing party.
Since the WFDL stated that attorney fees were to be paid by the non-
prevailing party, then the arbitrator was in error for not ordering Tiffany to
pay Watts' attorney fees.
60
If the court were to adopt the position that a legal error was evidence of
manifest disregard, then future arbitration agreements would be open for
review. The implications of this position caused the court great concern. To
say that any legal error might result in the vacatur of the arbitration award
55 Id. at 578-79 (quoting Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2000)).
56 See id. at 578-79.






produce precarious and possibly undesirable results in the future. In
particular, the court recognized that if they adopted this interpretation, then
no arbitration award would ever be final and the courts would be forever
reviewing what was once unreviewable. Every disgruntled party would bring
suit trying to vacate the award. In the court's eyes, this would defeat the very
reasons that arbitration is used in the first place-to provide a quick,
inexpensive and conclusive resolution of the dispute.61
Perhaps the answer was to require a more egregious error than just
merely ignoring existing law. The court posited that perhaps the answer was
not that any legal error had been committed, but that "clear" legal error was
committed.62 Although the court did not attempt to define what constituted
"clear" error versus simple legal error, the distinction still did not yield
satisfactory results and did not remove the fear that arbitration awards would
always be subject to judicial review. In fact, the post-award litigation might
involve a more complex legal analysis. The determination of clear legal error
would involve judgment as to how extensive the legal error must be to
constitute "clear" error.63 So, in each case, the law would have to be
carefully scrutinized to determine how blatant the error must be to constitute
manifest disregard.64 For example, Watts is saying that Wisconsin law
controls whether attorney fees are covered, but the issue that would have to
be decided is whether the law provides for mandatory payment or rather just
permits the fees to be paid.65
The court concluded that neither approach is correct. Legal error-
whether clear or simple-is not sufficient grounds for a judicial review of the
arbitration award. Rather, the proper question is whether the arbitrator
interpreted the contract.
[T]he question for decision by a federal court asked to set aside an
arbitration award... is not whether the arbitrator or arbitrators erred in
interpreting the contract; it is not whether they clearly erred in interpreting
the contract; it is not whether they grossly erred in interpreting the contract;
it is whether they interpreted the contract. 66
Interpreting the contract simply means that the arbitrator examined the
words of the contract in light of the dispute at hand. That language, in




6 4 Id. (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmnarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399-405 (1990)).
65 Id.
6 6 Id. (quoting Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (7th Cir. 1987)).
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the dispute is outside of the "law" of the contract, then the arbitrator has
acted in manifest disregard of the contract, and the federal court may
intervene. However, if judicial intervention is mandated, the relationship
between arbitrators and judges established in the Steelworker's Trilogy67 will
be broken.
68
Obviously, there was no clear answer as to how the court should interpret
the doctrine. The court tried to resolve its dilemma by examining how the
Wilko dicta had been applied in previous cases. The outcomes of various
cases were mixed.69 In some cases, the arbitration award was put aside when
the arbitrator treated the law as an obstacle to reaching another preferred
result on other grounds.70 Still other cases have found the opposite result-
that arbitrators were not obligated to apply any rules of law which were
outside of the parties' agreement.71
Several of the Seventh Circuit decisions, such as Koveleskie v. SBC
Capital Markets, Inc., 72 reaffirmed the idea that manifest disregard is a
67 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
6 8 See Watts, 248 F.3d at 579.
69 See id. at 579-80
7 0 1d. at 580 (citing Nat'l Wrecking Co. v. Local 731, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 990
F.2d 957 .(7th Cir. 1993); Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir.
1992)).
71 Id. (citing Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross Inc., 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994);
Flender Corp. v. Techna-Quip Co., 953 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992); Chameleon Dental
Products, Inc. v. Jackson, 925 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1991)).
7 2 Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., 167 F.3d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 1999). See also
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) ("IThe court will set that
decision aside only in very unusual circumstances."); Nat'l Wrecking Co. v. Teamsters,
990 F.2d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 1993) ("In order for a federal court to vacate an arbitration
award for manifest disregard of the law, the party challenging the award must
demonstrate that the arbitrator deliberately disregarded what the arbitrator knew to be the
law in order to reach a particular result"); Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975
F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992) ("In any event, to vacate an arbitration award for
manifest disregard of the law, there must be something beyond and different from mere
error in law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law; it must
be demonstrated that the majority of arbitrators deliberately disregarded what they knew
to be the law in order to reach the result they did."). But see Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon
& Ross, 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The grounds for setting aside arbitration
awards are exhaustively stated in the statute. Now that Wilko is history, there is no reason
to continue to echo its gratuitous attempt at non-statutory supplementation."); Flender
Corp. v. Techna-Quip Co., 953 F.2d 273, 279 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[I]f we determine that the
arbitrator clearly went beyond the terms of the contract to reach the outcome indicated in
his opinion, we will set aside and vacate an arbitration award."); Chameleon Dental
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recognized non-statutory way of vacating an arbitration award. 73 The court
may have settled the question as to whether the federal court had a basis to
review the case, but it was still left with the problem of clarifying the vague
dicta in Wilko. The court had failed to clarify the dicta even when it was used
in later decisions such as First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.74 The
Watts court was determined to shed light on the ambiguity and to do so in
such a way where the roles of the arbitrator and the role of the federal court
would not be unnecessarily intertwined. It was determined that arbitrators are
the agents of the parties and as such, they could do anything that the parties
could do except directly order the parties to violate the law.75 If the arbitrator
did that through his decision, this would be a clear example of manifest
disregard. Since the arbitrator is the parties' agent, the arbitrators may do
anything that the parties may do directly.76
C. The Eastern Decision and Manifest Disregard
The Watts court relied heavily on the analysis used in Eastern Associated
Coal v. United Mine Workers77 to resolve the definitional issue of manifest
disregard. Eastern was seen as a case very similar to that of Watts.78 The
Watts court felt that the point of similarity was that in both cases "what the
parties may do, the arbitrator as their mutual agent may do."'79 This
viewpoint would allow for a great deal of deference to the arbitrator's
decision and would permit judicial review in only a small number of
circumstances. 80 Eastern was illustrative of whether an arbitrator could order
the employer to reinstate a truck driver who had twice failed a drug test. The
company went to federal court to vacate the arbitration award stating that the
arbitrator's award was contrary to public policy-another form of legal
disregard as represented by public policy.81 The arbitrator had concluded the
Prods., Inc. v. Jackson, 925 F.2d 223, 225 (7th Cir. 1991) ("When asked to set aside an
arbitration award, our review is restricted to determining whether the arbitrator actually
interpreted the contract.").
73See id. at 366.
74 SeeFirst Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
75 See Watts, 248 F.3d at 580.
7 6 Id. (citing E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am. Dist. 17, 531
U.S. 57, 62 (2000)).
77 E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am. dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57
(2000).
78 Watts, 248 F.3d at 580-81.
79Id. at 581.
80 See id. at 579.
81 See id. at 580.
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termination was not for "just cause" and ordered reinstatement. Eastern
brought suit in district court, but the district court affirmed the award saying
that it was not against the public policy prohibiting drug use on safety-related
occupations. 82 The Fourth Circuit agreed saying that a collective bargaining
agreement grants the arbitrator certain authority, which is contained within
the terms of the agreement. As long as the collective bargaining agreement
itself is not contrary to public policy, then the actions of the arbitrator are not
in manifest disregard of the law.83 The court had the responsibility to
determine whether the agreement violated public policy.
84
The court concluded that although arbitrators may not order the parties to
violate the law, they have discretion to choose a variety of arbitral outcomes
when the law allows for compromise. In Eastern, the Supreme Court
explained by saying that since reinstatement was within the employer's
discretion, the arbitrator, acting as the employer's agent, could also
permissibly order the reinstatement. In other words, the Supreme Court
assumed that reinstatement was within the bounds of what was allowed in the
contract; therefore, the arbitrator, who is contractually vested with the
authority to interpret that contract, must have acted appropriately. 85 If there
was no actual prohibition by the law, then the Court had to assess whether
there was clear public policy that specifically would have prohibited the
reinstatement.
The Supreme Court cautioned that the public policy exception must meet
very specific criteria.86 An assessment of public policy in this particular case
involved looking at existing laws and how those laws were put into practice.
If a federal rule existed that prohibited the employment of a drug-using truck
driver, then the arbitrator would have essentially been ordering the parties to
violate the law by reinstating him. That action would constitute a manifest
disregard of the law. Eastern asserted that there was a public policy issue at
stake that could be easily discerned by examining the relevant law, the
82 Eastern, 531 U.S. at 61.
83 Id. at 62. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
84 Eastern, 531 U.S. at 62.
85 Id. at 61-62. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
86 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983). The Court
stated that any public policy must be "explicit," "well defined," and "dominant." The
court should not have to ascertain public opinion on a policy issue, rather the policy must
be "ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general
considerations of supposed public interests."' (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union




Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 (Act) and the
Department of Transportation's (DOT) implementing regulations.
87 While
there did seem to be a strong prohibition against drug use among public
transportation workers, the Act also emphasizes the rehabilitative aspects of
drug use. Bearing this in mind, the Court stated that there was no prohibition
on reinstatement of an offender and seemed to imply that there was an
overriding duty to do so. 88 Therefore, the arbitrator's decision was consistent
with public policy, and there was no manifest disregard of the law.
The Eastern decision viewed the "manifest disregard" doctrine as
representing one of two things: "an arbitral order requiring the parties to
violate the law (as by employing unlicensed truck drivers), and an arbitral
order that does not adhere to the legal principles specified by contract, and
hence unenforceable under § 10(a)(4)." 89 The court used the Eastern
standard in deciding Watts, but concluded that neither of the two examples of
manifest disregard applied.90
D. Analysis of Watts
Since the court took the Eastern approach in analyzing the facts in Watts,
the first step was to examine whether there Was anything in Wisconsin law to
prevent the parties from coming to a similar agreement that had been
contained in the arbitration agreement. There was no actual language in
Wisconsin law that prohibited the parties from assuming their own legal
fees.91 The court reasoned that since there was no legal prohibition, the
arbitrator was within his power in refusing to grant attorney fees to Watts.
Furthermore, the award did not require either Watts or Tiffany to violate
Wisconsin state law. 92 Since nothing in the law prevented the parties from
assuming their own attorney fees, then, as in Eastern, the arbitrator was
allowed to render an award requiring each party to shoulder the burden of its
own attorney fees.93 If the parties wished to place limitations on what the
arbitrator could do, they could always do so through a contract. For example,
the parties could have adopted the "no split" rule, in which the arbitrator
would be prohibited from splitting the difference of the costs. 94 Then, if the
87 Eastern, 531 U.S. at 63.
88 See id. at 63-66.
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arbitrator had rendered the same decision whereby the parties pay their own
attorney fees, the arbitrator would have been acting beyond his scope of
authority as outlined in the contract. The issue would then fall under 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a)(4). 95 If the arbitrator did not disregard the parties' contract, direct
them to violate the law, or overstep his authority under the arbitration
agreement, the trial court may properly enforced the award as written. Such
was the case in Watts. Thus, the court effectively rejected the manifest
disregard doctrine by adopting the Eastern standard that allowed the
arbitrator to do whatever the parties could.
96
Since the arbitrator "did not disregard the parties' contract, did not direct
them to violate the law, and did not otherwise overstep the terms of his
engagement," the arbitrator did not demonstrate a manifest disregard of the
law. 97 The court affirmed the lower court's decision.
E. Criticism by the Concurrence
Judge Williams, concurring only on the judgment, sharply criticized the
court's analysis, saying that there was no need to address the manifest
disregard doctrine since this was not a manifest disregard case.98 Williams
contended the court compounded its error by rejecting the doctrine. 99 The
majority had claimed that the history of circuit court opinions in the Seventh
Circuit demonstrated a notable lack of consistency in how the court defined
manifest disregard. There was some evidence that the doctrine had been
interpreted and utilized in a consistent manner among the federal district





9 9 See id.
100 Greenberg v. Bear, Steams & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 2000); Health Servs.
Mgt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992). In Greenberg, the appellant,
an investor, charged that the brokerage firm was engaged in fraudulent activities in
violation of federal and state laws committed by Sterling Foster, an employee of Bear
Stems. Greenberg, 220 F.3d at 24-25. The arbitrator found for Bear Steams, and
Greenberg claimed that the arbitrator's decision was in manifest disregard of the law.
Greenberg requested that the federal court vacate the award. Id. at 25. The district court
denied the petition, but the court of appeals found no manifest disregard since the
arbitrator's interpretation of the law was reasonable. The court made note of the
importance of the case by stating:
This appeal squarely presents the question of whether and under what
circumstances federal courts have jurisdiction to hear motions to vacate arbitration
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knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it
altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator was well-defined,
explicit and clearly applicable to the case.101 The burden of proof to
demonstrate whether one of the two definitions applies falls- on the party
bringing the action.102 If manifest disregard forms a major part of the
petitioner's claim and that claim is in good faith, the federal question
becomes substantial enough to warrant the court's intervention. 10 3 "Federal
courts have a strong interest in ensuring that arbitrators interpret and apply
federal law properly."'
10 4
Watts met those criteria for review by the federal court, but the way in
which the Watts majority analyzed manifest disregard turned a once
consistent doctrine into an inconsistent doctrine. Williams claims all the
circuit courts had adopted the two-part definition, and no inconsistency in
previous Seventh Circuit decisions existed. The majority's rejection of that
definition was not only contrary to the interpretation used by other circuits,
but was based on a trivial point-that the arbitrator may not force the parties
to violate the law which was a point previously established in other cases.
105
The court's reliance on the Eastern decision was improper since Eastern
was not a manifest disregard case. The Eastern case involved an arbitrator
who was empowered to interpret the contract based on the parties' prior
collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate their case. Therefore, Eastern
was a case involving a collective bargaining dispute and whether the
arbitrator acted within his scope of authority in interpreting the contract.
Williams strongly disagreed that the case demonstrated the agency theory
embraced by the majority-that the arbitrator is acting as the parties'
agent. 10 6 Rather than taking the view that the arbitrator's role was defined by
agency theory, the key question was whether the arbitrator acted beyond the
scope of the contractual powers granted to him by the parties' contract to
awards. We conclude that the district court had jurisdiction in this case because
Greenberg challenged the award primarily on the grounds of manifest disregard of
federal law. Nevertheless, Greenberg has not met the very stringent burden of
demonstrating the sort of manifest disregard required to vacate the award. Therefore,
we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Id.
101 Id. at 28.
10 2 Id. See also Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems
Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997).
103 Greenberg, 220 F.3d at 27.
104 Id. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987).
"[A]lthough judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is
sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute." Id.
105 Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1987).
106 George Watts & Son v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 584 (7th Cir. 2001).
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arbitrate. If the arbitrator had acted beyond that contractual power, the
agreement could be vacated for manifest disregard. Williams stated that the
arbitrator is bound by the law and must adhere to legal proscriptions, unless
otherwise directed by the parties' agreement. 107 Thus, manifest disregard
refers only to whether the arbitrator exceeded contractual powers. The Hill
case reiterates the importance of discerning whether the arbitrator actually
interpreted the contract-not whether that interpretation was correct. Hill
clearly stated that only if the arbitrator failed to interpret the contract could
there be grounds for manifest disregard. If the arbitrator did interpret the
contract, even if that interpretation is incorrect, the arbitrator is acting within
the scope of his or her authority. 108 If the arbitrator must go beyond the
contractual requirements and interprets statutory law, the courts require
"something beyond and different from mere error-in law or failure on the part
of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law." 109 In other words, did the
arbitrator know the law and yet flagrantly disregard the law? If so, the
arbitrator exhibited manifest disregard and the award must be vacated.
Williams criticized the majority's assertion that the Seventh Circuit had
produced conflicting case law interpretations regarding manifest disregard.
Williams saw the two lines of case decisions as being complementary, not
conflicting. Citing Dawahare v. Spencer,110 Williams pointed to the great
difficulty other circuits have encountered in determining whether there has
been manifest disregard of the law, since many arbitrators do not write down
their decisions.I 1' When there is ample evidence of the arbitrator's manifest
disregard, the courts have had little difficulty in vacating the award. Thus, the
manifest disregard doctrine cannot be applied to cases without a written
decision, since it is virtually impossible to determine whether an arbitrator
has acted in manifest disregard of the law under those circumstances.
However, when a written decision has been made, a thorough examination
may commence, and the manifest doctrine analysis can be applied.
The majority's view that arbitrators are agents of the parties and
empowered to order only those things that the parties themselves may do,
seems at odds with the Supreme Court's notion regarding arbitration
agreements. The Supreme Court has stated that arbitration agreements may
dictate the forum for resolving disputes, but they are not waivers of a party's
107 Id. at 583.
108 Hill, 814 F.2d at 1194-95; see United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
109 Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992).
110 Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2000).
111 Watts, 248 F.3d at 583. The court stated, "[a]rbitrators are not required to explain
their decisions. If they choose not to do so, it is all but impossible to determine whether
they acted with manifest disregard for the law."
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rights under a statute. 112 Therefore, even if there were an arbitration
agreement, the parties still would not be able to instruct the arbitrator to
ignore the demands of the statute. Similarly, it is unreasonable to assume that
just because the parties have the ability to rescind their arbitration agreement,
does not mean they can give license to the arbitrator to ignore the contract.
Given these limitations, the arbitrator cannot be an agent of the parties since
his power is limited. If the arbitrator exceeds those limited powers, then the
court has ample reason to intervene and vacate the award. The proper
analysis remains to be whether the existing laws prohibit the enforcement of
the arbitrator's award.
F. The Concurrence's Analysis of Watts
In this case, the proper analysis is to examine whether the Wisconsin
statute clearly and unambiguously mandates that the winning party receive
payment of attorney fees. That burden of proof falls to the plaintiff.113 Watts
failed to meet this burden due to his inability to show that the Wisconsin law
was clear and explicit in mandating attorney fees for the prevailing party.
114
The statute made no reference to the recovery of attorney fees, much less
state that the recovery of fees is mandatory.
Watts did not rely just on Wisconsin law to make his case. He pointed to
the decision in Siegel v. Leer, Inc.,115 which provided that attorney fees
provisions are an "express statutory right of a dealer to recover for a
grantor's violation of the W'FDL." 116 While on the surface, it may seem like
the case supports Watt's position, Watts used the case out of context. In
Siegel, the court distinguished awards of attorney fees from another case in
which a court-initiated fine was found to violate public policy. Although the
court stated that the right to attorney fees was expressly provided by statute,
it did not hold that attorney fees are mandatory. Other cases have emphasized
112 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985). "By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than
ajudicial, forum." Id.
113 Greenberg v. Bear, Stems & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 2000).
114 WIS. STAT. § 135.06 (2000), which states that, "[i]f any grantor violates this
chapter, a dealer may bring an action against such grantor in any court of competent
jurisdiction for damages sustained by the dealer as a consequence of the grantor's
violation, together with the actual costs of the action, including reasonable actual attorney
fees."
115 Watts, 248 F.3d at 584 (citing Siegel v. Leer, Inc., 457 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1990)).
116 Siegel, 457 N.W.2d at 537.
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that attorney fees are an entitlement, not a right. 117 Therefore, Watt's reliance
on the case was misplaced.
Tiffany relied on a published commentary regarding whether attorney
fees are mandatory or discretionary under the WFDL and concluded that it is
still an open issue.118 Williams tended to agree with that view, and stated that
while attorney fees may be mandated in the future, the law does not currently
mandate them. Tiffany further argued that there was nothing to indicate that
the arbitrator relied on the Wisconsin statute. 119 Williams thought little of
this position stating:
[t]his court need not strain credulity to support an arbitral award, simply
because the arbitrator did not explicitly state the grounds for her decision.
There is ample evidence in the record showing that Watts abandoned its
other contract claims, and that the only remaining basis under which the
arbitrator could have decided this case was the WFDL. That the arbitrator
may not have correctly applied the statute will not frustrate a court's review
for manifest disregard of the law. 12 0
Since both the statute and the doctrine of manifest disregard are clear,
Williams concluded that Watts failed to make a showing that the arbitrator
had engaged in manifest disregard of the statute.121 Williams stated that
although the law may be interpreted in the future to require the mandatory
award of attorney fees, it was not going to decide that issue in this case.
Watts failed in his attempt.
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of manifest disregard has been severely limited by the
Seventh Circuit. This position will not be without its critics. The court took a
decidedly novel approach by characterizing manifest disregard as embodying
agency theory. By doing this, it essentially destroys most vacatur actions that
rely on manifest disregard unless the arbitrator has blatantly ordered the
parties to disregard the law or has required the parties to perform beyond
their own powers. Thus, the Seventh Circuit has posited a novel position,
somewhere in between the overt rejection of the doctrine by the Eleventh
117 Esch v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., Inc., 510F. Supp. 53,58 (E.D. Wis. 1981)
118 Watts, 248 F.3d at 584 (citing Andrew 0. Riteris & Susan R. Robertson, The
Fair Dealership Law: Good Cause For Review, WiS. B. BUL., Mar. 1986, at 10).
119Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 584-85.
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Circuit and the .enthusiastic endorsement of the doctrine by the Second
Circuit.
Even though the rationale for the decision is heavily criticized by Judge
Williams, it is very likely that' those courts which have a conservative
interpretation of the manifest disregard doctrine will see this-interpretation as
one bolstering the view that arbitrators have a great deal of discretion in
interpreting the contract. If the award binds the parties in a way that they
could have agreed to on their own, this is a sufficient enough justification for
the award without having to ponder whether the award violates the law. In
this way, the Watts decision makes the rejection of the manifest disregard
doctrine less convoluted. Courts will not need to address whether the law has
been broken. Rather, they will need to determine that the two parties could
have opted for the same course of action, even if that outcome is extremely
unfavorable to one of the parties.
While it may be unlikely that the Second Circuit adopts the Seventh
Circuit's agency approach of manifest disregard, it is highly likely that the
majority of circuits will turn to it. The pendulum will swing full circle in the
federal courts taking a "hands-off" attitude towards arbitration agreements,
thereby reinforcing the original idea that arbitrators have very specific
powers as defined by the parties. In this way, the courts will not have to exert
special effort scrutinizing the evidence of the case nor in deciding whether
the evidence supported the arbitrator's finding. The analysis will be merely
whether the parties could have agreed to the same provisions as in the
arbitration contract.
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